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Introduction
As part of the Agenda 2000 package, the EU Structural
Funds are currently going through a reform process in
order to increase their effectiveness and to prepare the
ground for the gradual integration of prospective new
Member States into the EU’s structural policy. At the
Cardiff European Council of June 1998, a political
deadline was set to conclude the reforms by March
1999. Due to the complexity of the issue and the
multiple actors involved, it is extremely difficult to
predict the outcome of these negotiations. Nevertheless,
by addressing 10 questions the reforms raise, this article
aims to sketch the likely implications for the
implementation of the Structural Funds in the next
programming period, 2000-2006.
EU Structural Funds: Principles and Objectives
Since the 1980s, the European Union (EU) has become
increasingly concerned about its internal economic and
social cohesion. Parallel to the deepening and widening
process of European integration, the EU’s cohesion
policy and its main instruments, the EU Structural
Funds,2 have been gradually strengthened. The
successive multi-annual financing agreements of 1988
and 1992 allowed substantial increases in the budgetary
resources for structural operations.3 At the Brussels’
European Council of February 1988, a political
agreement was reached on doubling the budget of the
Structural Funds in real terms between 1987 and 1993.
Subsequently, Member States agreed at the Edinburgh
European Council in December 1992 that the budget for
structural operations would be further increased, in
particular for the cohesion countries (Greece, Ireland,
Portugal and Spain).
These budget increases were linked to a series of
major reforms of the Structural Funds that were
undertaken in 1988. The legal basis for these reforms
had already been inserted in the Single European Act of
1986 (cf. Art. 130d EC Treaty) and the reforms were
subsequently introduced through a number of EC
regulations adopted by the Council in June and December
1988. In the course of 1993, these regulations were
modified, although at that time this did not involve any
fundamental changes comparable to those made in
1988. Therefore, the 1993 regulations, governing the
EU Structural Funds, are generally considered to be
merely a consolidation of the 1988 reforms.4 Indeed, the
main principles introduced at that time continue to
govern the Structural Funds today and the forthcoming
Agenda 2000 reforms will reconfirm the importance of
these principles.
The first principle that was established in 1988 was
the “concentration” principle. This meant that the
Structural Funds were to be concentrated on a limited
number of priority Objectives. For the programming
period 1994-1999, the following seven Objectives were
defined:5
• Objective 1: Promoting the development and
structural adjustment of regions whose development
is lagging behind (ERDF, ESF, EAGGF-Guidance,
FIFG);
• Objective 2: Converting the regions, frontier regions
or parts of regions (including employment areas and
urban communities) seriously affected by industrial
decline (ERDF, ESF);
• Objective 3: Combating long-term unemployment
and facilitating the integration of young people, and
persons vulnerable to exclusion from the labour
market, into working life (ESF);
• Objective 4: Facilitating the adaptation of workers
of either sex to industrial changes, including changes
in production systems (ESF);
• Objective 5a: Promoting rural development by
speeding up the adjustment of agricultural structures
in the framework of the reform of the Common
Agricultural Policy (EAGGF-Guidance, FIFG);
• Objective 5b: Promoting rural development by
facilitating the development and structural
adjustment of rural areas (ERDF, ESF, EAGGF-
Guidance);
• Objective 6: Promoting the development and
structural adjustment of regions with an extremely
low population density (ERDF, ESF, EAGGF-
Guidance, FIFG).
Moreover, Structural Fund support had to become
part of the multi-annual integrated programmes (the
“programming” principle). In this regard, it was aimed
at ensuring better coordination of the various measures.
The programme-approach had far-reaching implications
for the management of the Structural Funds both at
European and Member State level. The programming
cycle consists of various stages. Initially, Member States
have to submit their development plans to the European
Commission. On the basis of these plans, the Commission
conducts negotiations with the Member States that
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result in the adoption of a Community Support
Framework for the respective countries and regions.
Subsequently, these framework agreements are
translated into several, more detailed, operational
programmes. Since the 1993 regulations entered into
force, Member States have also had the opportunity to
negotiate so-called Single Programming Documents,
which essentially constitute a merger of the provisions
in the Community Support Framework and those in the
respective operational programmes. Hence, the
underlying idea for this modification was to shorten the
programming procedure.
Closely related to the programming principle, the
1988 reforms also established the “partnership” principle
requiring close cooperation between the European,
national and sub-national authorities and bodies involved
in the entire policy process. Though the partnership
principle has been implemented in various ways in the
different Member States, it has led in general to a
number of fundamental changes. One of the most obvious
consequences was that regional and local authorities, as
well as economic and social partners and various interest
groups, etc., have become more closely involved in the
design and implementation of the Structural Funds
programmes, and that they have increasingly established
direct links with the European Commission for these
purposes.
Finally, the “additionality” and “co-financing”
principles were confirmed as key features of the
Structural Funds. Hence, the EU Structural Funds cannot,
in principle, be used to replace Member States’ funds
while the States are obliged to provide up to half of the
funds (depending on the objective) needed for the
programmes and projects that are eligible for structural
support.
Structural Funds budget for 1994-1999 and the
concentration principle in practice
For the 1994-1999 period, a total budget of EUR 138.2
billion was allocated to the Structural Funds, which
represents only a small fraction of the total gross national
product (GNP) of all EU Member States (less than
0.50%). The largest part of the total budget was reserved
for Objective 1 regions (68%). More than 84% is
allocated to the four regional objectives (1, 2, 5b and 6).
In absolute terms, Spain is the biggest recipient of
Structural Funds (23% of the total budget) and just over
half of the budget is allocated to just three Member
States (Spain, Italy and Germany). The share of the four
cohesion countries (Spain, Portugal, Ireland and Greece)
amounts to 47% of the budget. When expressing the
Structural Fund transfers in per capita terms, these four
countries are the biggest beneficiaries.
In total, at present almost 51% of the EU population
lives in areas which are eligible under one of the
Structural Funds’ four regional objectives. Objective 1
regions alone represent 26.6% of the EU population,
which is a significant increase compared to the previous
period (1989-1993), when it was 21.7%. It is generally
recognised that the available budget for the Structural
Funds has been widely spread over all EU Member
States: a situation which was primarily the result of a
political compromise that was needed to secure
agreement among the Member States. Commission
statistics show for instance that about 6.6% of the total
EU population lives in regions eligible for Structural
Funds, but which do not receive regional state aid under
the stricter state aid rules. Obviously, the relatively
limited budget and the way the Structural Funds are
spread widely limit the effectiveness of the policy.
Therefore, one of the main challenges for the next
programming period will be to ensure a greater
concentration of the Structural Funds and thus a reduction
in the population coverage of the funds.
Agenda 2000 reforms negotiated under strict
budgetary constraints
The negotiations on the Agenda 2000 package in general
and the reform of the EU Structural Funds in particular
are marked by at least one very distinctive feature.
Contrary to the financial perspectives agreed in 1988
and 1992, there is at present little prospect of any further
budgetary increase. Indeed, “budgetary stabilisation”
became the buzzword in the negotiations. Therefore,
there seems to be general political agreement that the
ceiling for the EU’s own resources will be maintained at
1.27% of the EU GNP throughout the period 2000-
2006. However, maintaining the ceiling would imply
that the next enlargement, which is assumed to take
place in 2002/2003, should result in a significant
redistribution of EU expenditure which at present goes
to the current Member States. In particular, Spain has
insisted that the own resources ceiling has to be
reconsidered when enlargement occurs – in order to
avoid the present Member States (in particular the
cohesion countries) seeing their receipts significantly
reduced following the accession of new Member States.
In the European Commission’s proposal for the
financial perspective for 2000-2006, the budget for
structural operations (heading 2) would amount to almost
EUR 286 billion (1999 prices) or around 36% of the
total budget (pre- and post-accession). This allocation
would limit structural operations to around 0.46% of the
enlarged EU GNP.
The EU 15 would receive almost 84% (EUR 239.4
billion) of the overall budget for structural operations:
the bulk going to the Structural Funds and in particular
to the Objective 1 regions, while a total budget of EUR
46.9 billion would be reserved for the prospective
Member States. From 2000 onwards, the applicants
would receive EUR 1040 million annually in the form
of pre-accession aid under the new Instrument for
Structural Policies for Pre-Accession (ISPA).6 For those
countries subsequently acceding to the EU, almost EUR
40 billion would be required for their gradual integration
into the structural policy.
It is important to note that the Commission’s
proposals implicitly included a request to current4
Member States to reduce their Structural Fund receipts
in order to reserve sufficient resources for the new
members. Indeed, if the own resources ceiling were kept
at 1.27% of the EU GNP, and the overall EU’s financing
mechanism essentially maintained, the European
Commission claimed in Agenda 2000 that enlargement
would be possible due to the expenditure growth margins
currently available. However, sticking to the present
ceiling would inevitably mean that EU payments to
present Member States would have to be reduced in
order to finance the enlargement. This point is already
very obvious with regard to the heading for structural
operations. According to the European Commission,
the 0.46% ceiling for heading 2 should be maintained
throughout the 2000-2006 period. However, in order to
do so, the allocation to present Member States would
have to be considerably below this ceiling. In fact, under
the Commission’s proposal, the structural operations’
transfers to the existing 15 Member States would
represent, on average, only 0.39% of the enlarged EU
GNP over the period 2000-2006. By 2006 this percentage
is set to decline to 0.33%. Hence, it is clear that, at least
with regard to structural operations, the present Member
States were de facto being asked to foot the bill for
enlargement – which explains the fierce reaction from
Spain. Moreover, it is obvious that the reduced Structural
Fund transfers would in particular concern some of the
current Member States, i.e. the cohesion countries.
The outcome of the negotiations on the new financial
perspective will largely influence the future of EU
cohesion policy, as it will determine the budgetary
boundaries. It is likely that, as with the previous financial
perspectives, agreement will first be sought on overall
future EU financing, and that subsequently the revised
regulations of the Structural Funds will have to be
finalised. In any event, the main principles underlying
the Structural Funds (concentration, programming,
partnership, additionality) will remain at the centre of
the policy. However, a new core principle will be added,
i.e. the improved effectiveness of Structural Fund
measures. Moreover, the proposals of the European
Commission envisage a far-reaching decentralisation
of the management of the Structural Funds, coupled
with a clarification of the respective roles and
responsibilities of the actors involved at European,
Member State and sub-national level. The legislative
proposals of the Commission, adopted on 18 March
1998, and the positions of the Member States are analysed
below by addressing 10 questions regarding the likely
implications for the implementation of the Structural
Fund reforms.
Question 1: Will there be more concentration of the
Structural Funds?
Given the fact that it is unlikely that the overall
Structural Fund resources will be increased in the next
programming period, the Commission proposals
essentially call for a greater concentration of the
Structural Funds by:
• reducing the number of priority objectives from
seven to three;
• reducing the number of Community Initiatives from
13 to three (i.e. INTERREG, LEADER and EQUAL);
• lowering the population coverage of the funds from
51% at present to 35-40% towards the end of the
next programming period (2006).
It is envisaged that the new Objective 1 would
receive the highest priority, targeting the poorest regions
in the Union. Around two thirds of the Structural Funds
would be allocated to Objective 1. The eligibility criteria
would not be fundamentally modified (those regions at
NUTS II level whose gross domestic product (GDP) per
capita in the last three years was less than 75% of the EU
average). However, some regions will be included in the
list for “special reasons” (outermost regions, current
Objective 6 regions, etc.). Moreover, the Commission
offered phasing-out arrangements for those regions
which have surpassed the 75% threshold. These
transitional arrangements are fairly generous as they
anticipate a gradual phasing-out of Structural Fund
support by 31 December 2005 (or in some cases by 31
December 2006) for Objective 1 regions which no
longer qualify. According to the most recent available
statistics on GDP per capita for 1994-1996, 10 regions
would be eligible for transitional support, i.e. Hainaut
(B), Cantabria (E), Corsica (F), “Arrondissements” of
Avesnes, Douai and Valenciennes (F), Ireland, Molise
(I), Flevoland (NL), Lisbon (P), Scottish Highlands and
Islands (UK) and Northern Ireland (UK).7
In total, it is envisaged that Objective 1 regions will
cover approximately 21.9% of the EU population. The
Commission aims to have a complete overlap of the
territory of these regions with those benefiting from
state aid under Art. 92(3)a of the Treaty.8
The new Objective 2 would provide support for the
economic and social conversion of regions suffering
from structural difficulties. It brings together Objectives
2 and 5b of the current programming period, and extends
them to other regions (urban areas in difficulties, regions
seriously affected by the decline of the fishing industry).
It is envisaged that the population covered by Objective
2 should not exceed 18% of the total EU population.
Regions currently eligible under Objectives 2 and 5b,
which no longer qualify for support in the next period,
will continue to receive support on a transitional basis,
but this will be phased out by 31 December 2003.
The new Objective 3, combining the current
Objectives 3 and 4, would support the adaptation and
modernisation of policies and systems relating to
education, training and employment. Those areas not
covered by Objective 1 or 2 would be eligible for this
horizontal objective.
The reduction in the number of priority objectives
does not seem to imply a fundamental re-arrangement
of them. It merely concerns a regrouping whereby the
scope of the present seven is essentially maintained.
Moreover, this regrouping leads to a rather heterogeneous5
mixture of issues covered by the objectives. For instance,
in the case of the new Objective 2, various issues are
brought together under one heading (regions suffering
from industrial decline, declining rural areas, crisis-hit
areas dependent on fishing industry, urban areas in
difficulty).
Regarding the planned reduction in the area covered
by the funds, it remains to be seen whether the
Commission will be very successful. Past experiences
have shown that effectively concentrating the funds is
apparently rather difficult for various reasons. The
proposals already anticipate that certain regions may be
eligible for EU support even though they do not strictly
comply with the main eligibility criteria. Moreover, the
proposed phasing-out arrangements are fairly generous
with regard to time. Thus, while the Commission aims
to reduce the area coverage to 35-40% of the total EU
population towards the end of the next programming
period, it may become rather difficult to achieve this
target, and it seems likely that the actual area coverage
will not constitute a significant reduction compared
with the present situation.
Question 2: How will be the Structural Funds be
allocated?
The Commission proposed a total budget for
structural operations amounting to EUR 286 billion for
the period 2000-2006. This includes:
– Structural Funds EUR218 billion
– Cohesion Fund EUR 21 billion
– Pre-accession aid EUR 7 billion
– Post-accession aid EUR 40 billion
The budget for Structural Funds would be sub-divided
as follows:
– 3 objectives EUR205 billion or
around 94%
– 3 Community initiatives EUR 11 billion or
at most 5%
– innovative schemes
and technical assistance EUR 2 billion or 1%
The Commission further proposed that “about” two
thirds of the Structural Funds would be spent on Objective
1 regions (i.e. about EUR 145 billion). During the
negotiations in the Council, some Member States have
asked for the word “about” to be deleted and for it to be
specified that the Objective 1 regions would receive
exactly two thirds of the funds. The outcome to this is
not yet known. However, looking at the current
regulation, it is likely that the new regulation will
include a reference (in the annex?) which will stipulate
in absolute amounts the precise allocation available for
Objective 1.
Initially, the Commission proposed making an
indicative breakdown – using transparent and objective
criteria – of the allocation per Member State for only
90% of the Structural Fund budget, i.e. ca. EUR 185
billion. The remaining 10% was to be put in the
performance reserve. However, subsequent opposition
by the Member States during negotiations has forced the
Commission to reduce this reserve to 4% of the total
budget (see below).
The draft regulation stipulates that for Objective 1
the Commission and for Objective 2 the Commission,
together with the Member State concerned, shall draw
up the list of eligible regions. However, it is possible that
these provisions will be modified during the negotiations.
It seems likely that, at least for Objective 1, the Member
States will insist that the list of eligible regions is
annexed to the regulation.
Question 3: Why have several Member States already
started drafting their development plans – anticipating
the adoption of the new Structural Fund regulations?
The preparation of the development plans is a crucial
phase for Member States. First of all, they have to
provide convincing arguments demonstrating the
existing structural weaknesses and thereby the need for
EU support. Hence, the plans have to contain a detailed
diagnosis of the economic and social situation of the
region concerned and set out the proposed development
strategy to overcome the existing problems. It is clear
that the development plan should not just constitute a
“shopping list” of projects for which funding is being
sought. This would be rejected. It is necessary to define
a comprehensive and integrated development strategy,
which effectively addresses the specific problems and
challenges of the region concerned.
Moreover, the Member States have to describe the
management structures and procedures that will be put
in place to monitor the implementation of the Structural
Funds. In other words, the second basic requirement is
to demonstrate that the Member States have the required
administrative capacity to manage the funds effectively.
Thus, preparing the development plans is a
cumbersome exercise for all Member States. The plans
are the eventual outcome of a time-consuming
consultation and negotiation process whereby various
ministries, sub-national authorities, economic and social
partners, interest groups, etc. are all asked to make
contributions.
This broad consultation and negotiation process is
extremely important for the smooth implementation of
the programmes later on. Close involvement of the
various partners from the initial phase onwards is likely
to increase their commitment to subsequently
implementing the development plan effectively.
The regulation specifies that the Member States
have to submit their development plans within three
months of the adoption of the Structural Fund regulations.
This is obviously a rather short period, and therefore
most Member States have started their preparations.
Following the submission of the development plans,
the Commission will decide on the Community Support
Frameworks or Single Programming Documents within
six months. The total nine-month period constitutes one
of the arguments that most likely swayed the Cardiff6
European Council of June 1998 to agree to set March
1999 as the deadline for concluding the negotiations on
the overall Agenda 2000 package.9 Indeed, if the new
Structural Funds programmes have to be launched early
2000 it is necessary to complete the negotiations by
March 1999, so that the deadlines in the Structural Fund
regulations can be observed.
Question 4: What is the status of the Commission
guidelines per objective?
A new element in the proposed regulations is that
after the adoption of the regulations and before the
Member States submit their development plans, the
Commission intends to publish a list of Community
priorities for each objective in the Official Journal. This
proposal has been highly criticised by various Member
States for various reasons. First of all, the timing was
questioned. Once the regulations have been adopted,
the Member States have three months to prepare and
submit their development plans. As mentioned above,
most Member States and regions concerned therefore
started preparations for their plans before the actual
adoption of the EC regulations. Thus, in reality there
will be very little time to take the Commission guidelines
into account. Therefore, at least some Member States
asked for these guidelines to be published earlier, in
order to avoid any delays in the drafting of plans and the
negotiations on the Community Support Frameworks
or Single Programming Documents.
Moreover, there was general uncertainty about the
precise nature of these “guidelines”. Are the guidelines
to be followed strictly by the Member States? Or, can
the plans significantly deviate from the Commission’s
guidelines? In other words, are the guidelines to be
considered as additional eligibility criteria?
It is worth consulting the guidelines that the
Commission published in 1997 for the adjustment of the
Structural Funds programmes for the programming
period 1994-1999. In response to a question of a member
of the European Parliament, the Commission stated that
the purpose of those guidelines was “to provide a
general policy and priority framework within which to
make adjustments to current programmes”.10 Hence, the
Commission argued that it was up to the monitoring
committees and relevant authorities to decide what
adjustments were needed to ensure maximum value for
money from the Structural Funds. As regards the
forthcoming guidelines for the next programming period,
the Commission aims to ensure that its priority themes
are known “in sufficient detail to be incorporated
adequately in the programming process at national
level”. It is expected that the Commission will formally
adopt and publish its guidelines at the time of, or soon
after, the adoption of the Structural Fund regulations
(i.e. within a month).
However, on 3 February 1999, the Commission
published its draft guidelines for the period 2000-2006,
thereby responding to some extent to the criticisms
made by the Member States. According to the
Commission, the new programmes should concentrate
on three main priorities: increasing the competitiveness
of regional economies, in order to create sustainable
jobs; increasing employment and social cohesion, mainly
through the upgrading of human resources; and urban
and rural development in the context of a balanced
European territory.11 It is illustrative that, due to the
considerable pressure from the Member States, the
regulation is now expected to refer to broad, indicative
guidelines.
Question 5: What are the implications for Member
State administrations of the proposals for further
decentralisation of the management structures?
Another important modification in the proposals is
the call for significant modifications in the management
responsibilities of the Structural Funds. In fact, a
substantial decentralisation is envisaged whereby the
Member States will become even more responsible for
the implementation, but at the same time also accountable
to the European Commission. Hence, the role of the
Commission will be limited to strategic programming,
ensuring respect for Community priorities and verifying
the results through monitoring, evaluation and financial
control.
This inevitably implies that the Member States and
their administrations will have a greater role, but also
more responsibilities in the actual day-to-day
management of the Structural Funds. Some uncertainties
remain regarding the future involvement of the
Commission in the monitoring process. What are, for
instance, the implications of limiting the role of the
Commission in the monitoring committees to only an
advisory one?
In any event, the proposed decentralisation implies
that, in the development plans, the Member States will
have to demonstrate that they possess the necessary
administrative capacities to effectively manage the funds.
The required administrative structures put in place to
manage the Structural Funds vary considerably from
one Member State to the other, whereas the structures
also differ depending on under which objective a region
is receiving EU funds. Thus, administrative capacity is,
indeed, a rather vague concept. Due to the absence of
any prescribed European model of management
structures, administrative capacity is eventually
measured by results. It is interesting to note that several
Member States have adjusted their administrative
structures on the basis of experience gained in managing
Structural Funds. In that regard, there is a need for
continuous evaluation of the effectiveness of the existing
structures and where necessary for adjustments to be
made.
Question 6: Will a Member State’s record of fund
implementation and absorption capacity in the current
programming period be taken into consideration when
allocating the funds?
The structural operations’ budget in the current7
financial perspective is politically regarded as not only
an expenditure ceiling but also as an expenditure target.
In other words, for political reasons, the Member States
agreed in 1992 that all measures would have to be taken
to ensure that the funds made available were also being
spent effectively by the respective Member States.
However, for various reasons, most Member States
faced considerable difficulties in actually utilising the
funds, at least in the initial phase of the current
programming period. The legislation includes provisions
on the so-called “automatic carry-over” of unused
allocations of Structural Funds to the next budgetary
year. It is important to note that for the next programming
period, the Commission proposed abandoning this
system of “automatic” carry-over. In the new
programming period, commitments not used after two
years would then be automatically de-committed.
Therefore, there would be a greater incentive for the
Member States to ensure that funds are effectively spent
on schedule.
Under the current proposal, the utilisation rate of the
Structural Funds in the current programming period
(1994-1999) is formally not considered as a criterion for
allocating funds for the next period. However,
informally, it seems likely that the record of Member
States in utilising the funds will be somehow taken into
account. Indeed, a notable under-utilisation of funds
may be due to inappropriate administrative structures
within the Member State concerned. Although the actual
allocation of Structural Funds is essentially the outcome
of a sensitive political bargaining process between the
Commission and the Member States, it is likely that
some of the actors involved will, during these
negotiations, closely watch the past implementation
record of Member States. In particular, in the current
political context, the Member States which are net
contributors to the EU budget will ask for convincing
evidence that the Structural Funds will be used in a more
effective and efficient way. Therefore, it is preferable
for Member States to provide sufficient information
justifying their administrative capacities to manage
Structural Funds and to implement the programmes
efficiently. This should be done in the development
plans, by presenting a clearly defined division of
responsibilities, outlining the programme management
structures and the administrative coordination
mechanisms put in place, describing the roles and
responsibilities of the various partners, outlining the
monitoring and evaluation mechanisms, etc.
Question 7: Will the proposals on the performance
reserve survive in the negotiations?
As mentioned above, the Commission initially
proposed that 10% of Structural Fund resources would
not be allocated to the Member States at the start of the
programming period. Rather, on the basis of the mid-
term evaluations, the Commission would decide before
31 March 2004 on the allocation of the resources in the
performance reserve to the most efficient operational
programmes or single programming documents. The
following criteria would be used:
• quality of programming: is EU assistance achieving
the initial targets?;
• administrative capacity: quality of management
regarding monitoring and evaluation, project
selection, financial control, etc.;
• rate of absorption of the funds;
• leverage effect: are efforts made to ensure a leverage
effect (involvement of private capital).
During negotiations, Member States have declared
their agreement, in principle, with the underlying
motivation for setting up the reserve, i.e. to give
incentives to increase the efficient use of the funds.
However, there was general opposition to the proposed
instrument. In fact, Member States expressed concern
that the criteria do not specify how the Commission
would precisely decide on the allocation of these reserves.
Furthermore, the proposed 10% corresponds to a
considerable amount in absolute terms (almost EUR 20
billion), i.e. the allocations for the performance reserve
would be almost equal the total budget proposed for the
Cohesion Fund. Hence, Member States were extremely
reluctant to accept such provisions as they do not
stipulate precisely how this significant budget would
eventually be distributed among the Member States.
Moreover, it is likely that the proposal would be
politically very sensitive to implement. As a result, it
remains uncertain whether the performance reserve
provides a workable tool for enhancing effectiveness as
it may prove difficult to apply it in practice.
Indeed, if the resources of the performance reserve
are eventually allocated to the best performing
programmes on the basis of objective and clearly defined
criteria, the proposal seems useful. However, the fear is
that the allocation would be done on a national pro-rata
basis to “efficient” programmes, with the programmes
that have encountered severe problems simply not
receiving their share of the remaining 10%. Under this
second scenario, the purpose and usefulness of the
performance reserve is questionable, as the most
efficiently performing programmes would not receive
an additional allocation above their proportional share
as a reward for their good performance.
Considering the fierce opposition of the Member
States during the negotiations, the Commission produced
a significantly amended proposal on the performance
reserve. Under this scenario, the resources of the
performance reserve would be equal to 10% of the
commitment appropriations from the last three years of
the programming period, 2004-2006 (i.e. around 4.3%
of total appropriations). Moreover, the resources of the
performance reserve would in fact become part of the
overall indicative allocation of each Member State, thus
becoming a reserve at Member State level. The resources
would subsequently be allocated at mid-term by the
Commission, but on the basis of a proposal of the
respective Member State taking into account criteria8
relating to efficiency, management and financial
performance. However, it seems that a compromise
solution has eventually been found whereby the resources
of the performance reserve will now be fixed at only 4%
of the Structural Funds budget.12
Question 8: Will the partnership principle be extended?
Regarding the partnership principle, the Commission
urged a broadening and deepening of its application.
Therefore, all partners concerned should be closely
involved in the entire policy cycle. This applies in
particular to regional and local authorities, economic
and social partners and other relevant organisations,
notably bodies dealing with environmental protection
and the promotion of equal opportunities for women
and men. In this regard, the Commission proposed that
the forthcoming development plans of the Member
States would incorporate the opinions of these partners.
As a consequence, their views would certainly have to
be given more weight or importance. Simply ignoring
the views expressed by partners would not be a feasible
option for Member States.
During the negotiations, the Member States have
objected to formally upgrading the role of the partners
in the process. The December 1998 Council report on
the Structural Fund reforms that was submitted to the
Vienna European Council presented a watered down
version of the involvement of the various partners in the
programming and implementation phase. Though the
outcome of the negotiations on this matter is not yet
known, it seems likely that the final text will probably
include a general reference to the partnership principle,
leaving the actual degree of involvement of the different
partners up to the respective Member States to work out.
However, from the experiences of several Member
States, it seems that the involvement of partners can be
extremely valuable. A key feature is that it can contribute
to building a broad consensus on the development
priorities contained in the development plan and/or the
Community Support Framework or Single Programming
Document, which will facilitate the subsequent
implementation of the programmes.
Question 9: To what extent are Member States
encouraged or obliged to attract private funding for
Structural Fund programmes?
The overall Structural Funds’ budget is – in relative
terms – rather limited and there is virtually no scope to
increase this budget in the next years. Therefore, in
order to increase the impact of the Structural Fund
programmes, there has been increasing focus on
combining the Structural Funds with various other
financial instruments. The latter can come from European
sources, such as loans from the European Investment
Bank or from Member State sources. Moreover, the
Commission encourages public-private partnerships in
the financing of large infrastructure projects.
In principle, the Community funds should primarily
be used for those projects that would not have been
undertaken in the absence of the EU funds. It is in this
regard that the Commission proposals for the new
programming period envisage that the co-financing
rates for the Structural Funds should be somewhat
adjusted. In general, the financial contribution of the
Structural Funds is limited to 75%, maximum, of the
total eligible costs and at least 50% of eligible public
expenditure for support in Objective 1 regions. However,
for those regions located in Member States that are
eligible for Cohesion Fund support, the Community
contribution can be 80% of total eligible costs, at most.
The EU contribution may rise to a maximum of 85% of
the total eligible costs for the outermost regions and the
outlying Greek islands.
Regarding measures under Objective 2 and 3
programmes, the Community contribution can be, at
most, 50% of total eligible costs and at least 25% of
eligible public expenditure.
However, the Commission proposed that the rates of
assistance be differentiated, taking into account:
• the gravity of the problems concerned, in particular
problems of a regional or social nature;
• the economic and financial capacity of the Member
State concerned, and the need to avoid excessive
increases in budget expenditure;
• the optimum utilisation of financial resources in
financing plans, including the combination of public
and private resources, and the use made of appropriate
financial instruments.
In the case of projects generating “substantial
revenues”, the Commission proposed that the
Community contribution should be restricted. The
concept of “substantial revenues” has been indicatively
defined by the Commission as net receipts equivalent to
at least 25% of the total cost of the investment concerned.
In those cases, the contribution would be determined
by taking into account the “intrinsic characteristics”,
including the size of the gross self-financing margin
expected. Under the proposals, Structural Fund assistance
would be limited:
(a) in cases where investments in infrastructure generate
substantial revenue to 40% of the total eligible cost
for Objective 1 regions, and to at most 50% in the
case of the Objective 1 regions located in Member
States benefiting from the Cohesion Fund;
(b) in the case of investment in firms to 35% of the total
eligible cost for Objective 1 regions. This may be
increased to 45% at most in the case of investments
in small and medium-sized enterprises.
Reactions in the Council have shown that so far
some Member States favour greater recourse to private
financing. Other countries have expressed doubts about
the way the multiplier effect on the mobilisation of
public and private resources would function. The issue
will be further discussed and therefore the outcome
remains uncertain at this moment.
In any event, the trend of the reforms in this matter9
seems fairly obvious. The Commission was seeking
ways to reinforce the leverage of structural assistance
by using various forms of assistance. It seems, therefore,
that the Member States are strongly encouraged to
demonstrate that adequate arrangements are being made
in their development plans to ensure “more developed
financial engineering”.
Question 10: What support will be given to the
prospective new Member States for their integration
into the Structural Fund programmes?
As of 2000 onwards, an annual budget of EUR 1
billion will be available for measures under the new
Instrument for Structural Policies for Pre-Accession
(ISPA). For the time being, only the applicant countries
of Central and Eastern Europe will be eligible for
support from ISPA. The draft ISPA regulation stipulates
that the Commission will make an indicative breakdown
of the assistance between the beneficiary countries
taking into account their population, per capita GDP
and surface area.
In its proposals for the EU’s pre-accession assistance,
the Commission stressed the need to gradually
decentralise the management of this assistance to the
applicant countries themselves. Hence, a major feature
of pre-accession aid is likely to be the opportunity it
provides to gradually build up experience in managing
such EU programmes as an essential learning exercise
in preparation for more substantial Structural Fund
programmes later on.
However, this proposed decentralisation is
conditional as it is subject to certain minimum criteria
and conditions. Indeed, the management of pre-accession
assistance will only be conferred to implementing
agencies in the applicant countries if these agencies can
demonstrate that they have the necessary administrative
capacities. In this regard, the Commission will apply the
following minimum criteria:
• the implementing agencies should have a well-
defined system for managing the funds with full
internal rules of procedure, and clearly stated
institutional and personal responsibilities;
• there must be a separation of powers so that there is
no conflict of interest in procurement and payment;
• adequate personnel must be available which must
have suitable auditing skills and experience in
implementing EU programmes.
In addition, the Commission will apply certain
minimum conditions for decentralising management to
agencies in the applicant countries, e.g.:
• the implementing agency must have an effective
internal control system;
• there must be a reliable national financial control
system over the implementing agency;
• EC procurement rules must be respected.
A major shortcoming of the ISPA assistance is that
it will only provide support for projects in the area of
environment and transport infrastructure. Hence, the
eligible measures are restricted to two sectors only.
More importantly, the support will be given to projects,
not programmes, the latter constituting the key feature
on which Structural Fund support is based.
In any event, the above mentioned minimum criteria
and conditions are a very clear indication that the new
Member States (like the current ones) will have to
demonstrate that they have the necessary administrative
capacities to manage EU assistance. Though this is
likely to require major and additional changes in the
applicant countries, the pressure exerted by the EU
might also become a facilitator to undertake these
reforms. As such, the preparations for the EU Structural
Funds may help to modernise the public administrations
in the applicant countries.
Conclusion: When should the reforms of the Structural
Funds be called successful?
It will still take a lot of heated political debates
before the on-going negotiations on the reform of the
Structural Funds are brought to a satisfactory conclusion.
The Commission proposals seem to a significant extent
to have anticipated possible fierce opposition from the
Member States concerning the reforms. In particular the
proposed phasing-out arrangements are fairly generous
as they allow those disqualifying regions to continue
receiving support at least partly and temporarily.
Although there are some strong arguments for choosing
such a gradual approach, this particular element of the
proposals is also a perfect illustration of the various
political interests that dominate the negotiations and
that will shape the outlook of the final compromise. If
the reforms are to become successful, it appears that at
least some improvements have to be made in the current
proposals:
A. Considering the tight budgetary context, it is even
more important that the Structural Funds should be
effectively more concentrated on the most important
and pressing problems. The funds should be allocated
to the Member States on the basis of objective
criteria, which have to be strictly applied in practice.
There should be a significant reduction in the
population coverage as a way of increasing the
overall effectiveness of the cohesion policy.
B. Member States should be further encouraged to
manage the Structural Funds more effectively. The
proposed decentralisation of management
responsibilities seems a step in the right direction,
though it leaves certain questions unanswered. The
performance reserve may not constitute a workable
tool for increasing the effectiveness, as it might be
politically too difficult to apply.
C. Finally, was Agenda 2000 not supposed to prepare
the Union for the enlargement? Indeed, the necessary
preparations should be made for the gradual
integration of the new Member States into the
cohesion policy. The proposed budget for the new
members may appear fairly modest for now and in10
contradiction with their relatively low-income levels
compared with the EU average. However, it may
also not be desirable at this stage to give significant
budget allocations to the applicant countries (or new
Member States) before they have given proof that
they have the necessary administrative capacities to
manage the funds. Present Member States should,
however, already demonstrate that the cohesion
objectives of the Treaty will apply equally to the
new Member States. Maintaining or even
strengthening the economic and social cohesion
within the enlarged EU will be a major challenge. It
is unclear to what extent the current reforms actually
address this matter, as they seem primarily to concern
an internal EU-15 discussion on how to divide the
Structural Funds’ cake.
RÉSUMÉ
Dans le cadre du paquet de mesures prévues par
l’Agenda 2000, les fonds structurels de l’UE traversent
actuellement un processus de réforme qui vise à en
accroître l’efficacité et à préparer la voie à une
intégration progressive des futurs Etats membres de
l’UE dans la politique structurelle. Les négociations se
caractérisent notamment par le fait que les perspectives
d’un accroissement budgétaire des fonds sont
actuellement pour ainsi dire inexistantes. Dès lors, il
convient de négocier les réformes en tenant compte de
sévères restrictions budgétaires.
Etant donné les ressources limitées et l’augmentation
prévue du nombre de bénéficiaires potentiels des fonds
structurels à la suite de l’adhésion des futurs Etats
membres, il est essentiel que les réformes actuelles
garantissent une plus grande concentration des fonds
structurels dans la prochaine période de programmation.
A défaut, l’efficacité des fonds restera relativement
limitée.
A cet égard, la Commission européenne a proposé
de réduire le nombre d’objectifs prioritaires et
d’initiatives communautaires. Par ailleurs, la couverture
des fonds structurels devrait être réduite progressivement
à 35-40% de la population totale de l’Union. Cependant,
au cours des négociations au Conseil, la principale
pomme de discorde entre les Etats membres portait sur
le budget global qui sera affecté aux fonds structurels
pour la période 2000-2006, sur la répartition de ces
fonds par Etat membre et par objectif, et sur quelques-
unes des modifications proposées aux procédures de
programmation et de gestion.
Lors du Conseil européen de Cardiff, en juin 1998,
le délai politique pour la conclusion des réformes de
l’Agenda 2000 fut fixé à mars 1999. Compte tenu de la
complexité des questions traitées et la multiplicité des
acteurs impliqués, il demeure extrêmement difficile de
prédire l’issue des négociations. Néanmoins, en se
penchant sur 10 questions soulevées par les réformes
des fonds structurels, cet article s’emploie à esquisser
les implications probables pour la mise en oeuvre des
fonds structurels au cours de la prochaine période de
programmation qui va de 2000 à 2006.
____________________
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